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This paper aims to examine the difference in effectiveness on development of least developed 
countries (LDCs) such as Uganda that opposing trade positions have.  Specifically, the paper will 
look at development state economic policies versus neoliberal policies in both regional and 
global trade to determine how they both effect development as defined by the Human 
Development Paradigm and the Neoliberal (Economic) Paradigm. 
Research for this paper came from a practicum-based internship with Southern and Eastern 
Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute Uganda (SEATINI).  The internship 
provided guidance for independent research and allowed for participant observation.  
Information was also gathered through interviews with various organizations and government 
ministries. 
This paper found that development state-led economic policies in global trade benefit LDCs such 
as Uganda most as it prevents exploitation of their markets by developed economies and 
promotes inclusive growth rather than exacerbating wealth inequality.  However, in regional 
trade free market policies work best as the East African region stands to gain as a whole.  
Currently, East Africa’s intra-regional trade is weak and everyone stands to benefit from 
increased trade.  Furthermore, exploitation of markets will not occur due to countries being of 
similar economic size (excluding Egypt and South Africa) and limitations on productive 
capacity.  To reach the full potential of these policies, however, will require strong capacity 
building in both negotiating and trading.  This will require a return to the outstanding issues of 
the Doha Development Agenda in negotiations at the WTO.  Ultimately, the paper finds the 
Africa rising narrative to be true if strong policy and good governance is attained. 
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1.0  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze developmental state-based policies in trade (defined as 
state-led macroeconomic planning) versus the current neoliberal trade position that Uganda 
currently employs and what the difference in effectiveness would be in achieving rapid 
development, viewed both through the Neoliberal Paradigm and the Human Development 
Paradigm.  Other objectives to this paper include understanding how LDCs such as Uganda can 
expand their trade and negotiation capacity. Lastly, the paper will measure the ability of Uganda 
to implement and enforce their trade policies. 
To accomplish these objectives, the researcher interned with the Southern and Eastern Africa 
Trade Information and Negotiations Institute Uganda (SEATINI) as a trade policy analyst in 
Kampala, Uganda.  The organization was created to help underdeveloped and developing 
economies in East Africa understand multi-lateral trade agreements and help these marginalized 
economies negotiate.  The governments of least-developed countries (LDCs) have limited 
capacity to negotiate and thus SEATINI engages third-world negotiators and helps them 
understand trade agreements (global and regional), while also developing alternative policies to 
help LDCs.  Since 1996, they have also been on the official negotiation delegation of Uganda, 
negotiating with the WTO, EPA and UNCTAD. 
SEATINI is strongly against the neoliberal paradigm and free-market economics, believing that 
it harms LDCs’ industries and allows larger economies to exploit their markets such as what 
happened with neoliberal structural adjustment programs, which collapsed many industries in 
Africa.  Instead, they are for a state-led economy.  They believe that the state has a bigger role to 
play in development and that while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is important, there is also a 
need for state-owned enterprises as well. 
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It is important to note that while SEATINI is anti-neoliberal in the context of global trade they 
also see the benefits of the free market between countries of equal economic size.  This is why 
they are pushing for a free trade area between the East African countries and some COMESA 
countries. 
At SEATINI the researcher conducted analysis of regional trade agreements and WTO 
negotiations, writing policy briefs on the research completed.  The researcher also prepared a 
paper on lessons learned from Singapore’s history as a developmental state.  This entailed sifting 
through legal texts, reports from organizations such as the EU and WTO, and talking with 
individuals formerly involved in these negotiations and agreements. 
Other information for this paper was gathered through interviews conducted at various 
organizations and government ministries.  Although difficult to obtain, these interviews gave 
perspectives on trade policy from each key stakeholder group. 
 
2.0  Background 
As Uganda looks to become an industry-based middle-income economy by 2020, they must 
tackle the question of how to best structure their trade position to achieve rapid development.  
This requires protecting their industries without losing access to markets or sacrificing industry 
growth.  Due to the government’s focus on economic growth as the first priority, they must also 
be careful not to sacrifice human development through the weakening of public participation in 
decision-making, failing to empower the marginalized and ignoring indicators such as life 
expectancy, education levels, literacy, health care and food security. 
Currently, the government and civil society lack the expertise and capacity to build and negotiate 
a trade position that will help them rapidly develop.  Ultimately, this is due to unbalanced power 
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dynamics within the WTO and other international organizations.  The result of this has been that 
Uganda has implemented liberalized trade policies against their national interests causing 
domestic markets to be heavily exploited by developed countries, leading to a huge trade deficit 
of over $4bn. 
On the other hand, within the EAC countries, Uganda is working away from protectionist trade 
policies towards a common free market in the region as a means towards inclusive growth and 
development.  While there are many roadblocks ahead, especially in the area of implementation, 
the implications of this position could be huge. 
To analyze the effect of these policies on development, the Human Development Paradigm and 
Neoliberal Paradigm will be employed.  Under the Human Development Paradigm development 
is measured by indicators of health, education and income, ensuring that quality of life is used as 
the main gage of development.  Under the Neoliberal Paradigm development is seen in terms of 
economic power and size and thus is measured by GDP. 
 
3.0  Justification 
While the World Trade Organization and other international administrative organizations are 
superficially equal through a requirement of total consensus, the reality is that undeveloped and 
developing economies lack any ability to push their own national development priorities.  
Through coercion, developed economies can ignore the interests of smaller economies by 
utilizing their positions on the UN Security Council and as international donors.  Therefore, it is 
important that Uganda develops and negotiates a trade position that will further their national 
development agenda in both economic growth and human development while maintaining good 
relationships with the developed economies or being able to withstand the penalty of working 
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against the interests of larger economies.  This is why I’ll be working with SEATINI, who hopes 
this will be achieved through building and negotiating a trade position that is inclusive of civil 
society and promotes a state-led economy that protects industries without suppressing trade and 
foreign direct investment. 
Furthermore, it is important to look at the difference between regional trade policies and global 
trade policies to understand the difference in effectiveness of ideological trade positions based on 
where they are implemented.  While neoliberal policies may hurt LDCs on a global level, they 
can be vastly beneficial on the regional level.  Understanding this difference will help to create 
and implement more well-informed and pragmatic policy that is less based on ideology. 
 
4.0 Objectives 
The objective of this study is: 
• To learn how Uganda can develop and negotiate a trade position (both globally and 
regionally) that will achieve rapid economic growth to accommodate Uganda’s shift to an 
industry-based middle-income country while also protecting and furthering human 
development priorities.  The study will analyze the effectiveness of developmental state-
based trade policies in helping small economies achieve rapid economic growth.  It will 
also look at the ability of these policies to promote human development.   
Secondary objectives are: 
• To assess how free-market values benefit Uganda in regional trade.  
• To understand how LDCs such as Uganda can expand their trade and negotiation 
capacity 
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Through an internship with SEATINI Uganda, these objectives were accomplished.  
Furthermore, the organization gained a better understanding of developmental state economics 
through the example of Singapore, whose economic history was analyzed by the researcher to 
provide lessons for the case of Uganda.  SEATINI also benefitted from an analysis conducted on 
the WTO’s future priorities for the next Ministerial Conference based on their public forum this 
year and how Uganda should respond.  Lastly, the organization gained an in-depth analysis on 




5.1 Research Approach 
To conduct this study, the researcher interned as a trade policy analyst for SEATINI Uganda.  
SEATINI Uganda’s mission is to build negotiation and trade capacity for East African LDCs 
such as Uganda, who otherwise lack the capability to negotiate global trade agreements 
beneficial to their national development interests.  SEATINI engages third-world negotiators and 
helps them understand trade agreements (global and regional), while also developing alternative 
policies to help LDCs.  The organization’s activities involve creating policy briefs for 
government review and dispersing information to civil society and key stakeholders.  The intent 
of the practicum was to analyze the various trade agreements and negotiations that Uganda is 
currently involved in and understand the effects it will have on national development. 
SEATINI is strongly against the neoliberal paradigm for global trade, believing that it allows the 
markets and industries of LDCs such as Uganda to be exploited by developed economies.  
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Instead, SEATINI advocates for state-led global trade policies with the state playing a hands-on 
role in the economy and protecting certain industries. 
SEATINI has members on the Inter-Institutional Trade Committee (IITC) and in the Ministry of 
Trade that creates the national trade positions for negotiations.  Since 1996, they have also been 
on the official negotiation delegation of Uganda, negotiating with the WTO, EPA and UNCTAD. 
 
5.2 Data Collection Methods 
Although this study was practicum-based, a few different methods were used to collect data for 
this research in order to get a full understanding of trade policies and its effect on development 
such as participant observation, independent research, and interviews.  By working with 
experienced organization members who have participated in international and regional trade 
negotiations and trade position development, the researcher gained a thorough understanding of 
the process on trade position development and negotiation capacity building.  The internship 
provided guidance through numerous assignments, involving both qualitative and quantitative 
research, focusing on trade development and capacity building.  Through participant observation, 
the researcher gained multiple perspectives on trade policy from the viewpoints of the 
agricultural, industrial and private sector. 
During the 5-week long internship at SEATINI, the method most commonly employed was 
independent research.  Most research was conducted through online exploration, particularly on 
the websites of the World Trade Organization, Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Cooperatives, TRALAC, and TradeMark East Africa.  This research method gave insights into 
the different perspectives of varying organizations and stakeholders on global and East African 
regional trade.  It provided general background information on the current state of negotiations 
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for varying deals and agreements.  It also gave direct access to legal texts on the agreements 
being analyzed.  Through independent research, an understanding of current trade policy and its 
historical implications were gained.  
Another method that was used were interviews.  A total of six interviews were conducted with 
various organizations.  These organizations were Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU), 
Uganda Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI), Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Cooperatives, Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA), Uganda Manufacturers’ 
Association (UMA) and Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB).  These interviews 
represented the varying viewpoints of different stakeholders from manufacturers to the 
government to the private sector.  Through this method, the benefits and costs of different trade 
positions were analyzed and better understood.  The information gained was useful for 
understanding the effects of different trade positions on different sectors of society and helped to 
reveal the disparity in interests between varying stakeholders.  Furthermore, interviews with 
government ministries helped to gain a better understanding of how trade positions are 
developed, implemented and enforced and where they fall short. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
During this practicum-based research, there were many limitations in the methodology used.  
While online research provided access to numerous viewpoints, articles alone did not provide 
enough information to accomplish many of this paper’s objectives.  This independent research 
was limited to a few official or assured sources with the vast majority of online articles not being 
reliable.  Even articles and papers from official sources such as the WTO website were heavily 
biased and failed to provide a wholesome picture.  Ultimately, these online articles provided only 
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background information and limited scopes of different issues while lacking any ability to 
observe or understand the reality of the situation on the ground-level. 
Participant observation allowed for on-the-ground observation of how trade policy is negotiated 
and its capacity expanded.  However, due to the nature of the office work, interactions among 
colleagues were limited.  Due to the language barrier it was also hard to understand when 
colleagues made informational remarks.  Ultimately, while it gave a better picture of the reality 
of on-the-ground trade policy work, participant observation was severely limited in its scope of 
knowledge due to colleagues only representing one set of opinions under the organization. 
The interview method had the most limitations and issues arise.  While the interviews provided 
differing viewpoints from varying key stakeholders, logistical issues prevented the interviews 
from reaching their full potential.  Scheduling interviews often required just showing up to the 
organization and speaking with whomever was available due to frequent failure to schedule 
interviews with specific members through email and phone.  The result of this was that often the 
interviewees were not prepared for the questions and thus had to give brief answers occasionally.  
Furthermore, interviews often had to be rushed or shortened due to a lack of time.  Lastly, the 
interviews often gave clashing information, making it hard to determine the truth. 
 
5.4 Ethics 
To maintain ethical integrity some precautions were taken.  The research gathered during the 
practicum came mostly from independent research and personal observation.  The integrity and 
truthfulness of the findings of this research is of the utmost importance in this paper. 
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This study required six interviews to be conducted.  These were managed in a confidential 
manner unless otherwise preferred by the interviewee.  All interviewees received a consent form 
to sign guaranteeing them privacy, confidentiality and anonymity if selected. 
 
6.0 Research Findings 
6.1 The Case for Developmental State-Based Policies in Global Trade 
This paper argues that developmental state-based policies in global trade are better for LDCs 
such as Uganda in both economic and human development rather than neoliberal policies such as 
the ones Uganda currently employs.  To understand the potential of developmental state-based 
policies, the example of Singapore’s economic history is examined and lessons for Uganda’s 
development is extracted: 
The small, island nation of Singapore began its development 51 years ago.  With no natural 
resources, a dearth of land and a small, uneducated population, it seemed like the country would 
never prosper.  Yet, today Singapore boasts one of the highest GDP per capita in the world with 
a very high quality of life.  This section seeks to understand the economic, geographic and 
political factors of Singapore’s success and the consequences of its development. 
Before looking into the economic and social policies that Singapore was built off of, it is 
important to recognize the geographic and historical factors that lead to these policies.  In 1965, 
when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia, its prospects looked grim.  It had no natural 
resources with only 580 square kilometers of land (and even less during high-tide).  The country 
was underdeveloped with no industry and had a population of recent immigrants with little 
shared history or bonds.   Furthermore, unemployment was close to 9% and Singapore depended 
heavily on the outside world for energy, food and even drinking water.  Even the future father of 
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the nation, Lee Kuan Yew, commented in 1957 on these glaring issues that an independent 
Singapore would be a “political, economic, and geographical absurdity.” 
From Singapore’s inception, there was strife.  Independence from Malaysia meant the loss of a 
common market.  The Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation from 1962-1966, cut off Singapore 
from its Southern hinterland, damaging the country’s role as a trading port for the region.  In 
1968, the British government withdrew its troops from Singapore, leaving a fifth of the economy 
vulnerable as thousands of workers became jobless overnight (Menon).   
Despite all of these factors, Singapore had a strategic trade location and was a natural harbor.  
Located at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, almost 40% of world maritime trade passes through 
the area (Economist, 2016).  Also, because of Singapore’s problems of underdevelopment, lack 
of self-sustainability and grim prospects, Singapore gained two clear objectives.  First, the 
nation’s survival was of the utmost importance, even at the expense of civil liberties.  The second 
objective was to create a better quality of life for the people through strong economic policies. 
While natural factors and good economic policies helped build Singapore into the nation it is 
today, the role of strong leadership cannot be overemphasized in Singapore’s process of 
development.  Under the leadership and guidance of Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister and 
father of Singapore, the country went from a series of small villages to the thriving economic 
powerhouse it is today.  In 1959, he was the Prime Minister, when Singapore won self-
government from Britain.  Under Lee Kuan Yew’s regime of honest and pragmatic governance, 
the country prospered.  He welcomed foreign trade and investment, and multinational 
corporations found the country to be a natural hub that encouraged their expansion (Economist, 
2015).  In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew retired, but his influence and guidance under pragmatic 
capitalism, continues to shape government policy today. 
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Singapore’s economic policies and government structure were effective at achieving rapid 
economic and human development (measured by the Human Development Index).  The 
government was kept lean, honest and efficient; qualities not found in most of Singapore’s 
neighboring countries.  During Singapore’s early years, two strategic economic decisions were 
made, against the conventional economic wisdom of the time.  The first decision was to shift 
away from import-substitution industrialization towards export-led industrialization.  Import-
substitution industrialization is a very protectionist trade and economic policy that advocates the 
replacement of foreign imports with domestic production.  It was very popular during the period 
of decolonization, especially among South American countries, for its anti-globalization/anti-
imperialism ideology.  Export-led industrialization, on the other hand, is a trade and economic 
policy that aims to accelerate a country’s industrialization process by exporting goods that the 
nation has a comparative advantage for.  Rather than protecting all domestic industries, this 
strategy implies opening markets to foreign competition in exchange for market access in other 
countries.  However, this doesn’t mean all domestic markets are open as the state wants to 
protect and cultivate specific nascent industries, to benefit from a future comparative advantage.  
Even export industries may be supported through subsidies.  Under export-led industrialization, 
countries hope to gain enough hard currency to import commodities that are manufactured more 
cheaply elsewhere.  The second strategy undertaken was to attract global multinational 
corporations to use as drivers of industrial growth.  Thus, Singapore regularly tops ease of doing 
business surveys. 
These two strategic decisions proved well for Singapore.  By promoting foreign direct 
investments and exports, during a time when most countries were not, Singapore had a decisive 
advantage.  But, to realize this advantage, the government had to take a more hands-on approach 
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in the economy.  The state developed infrastructure facilities and industrial land, invested in 
basic education with strong emphasis on technical skills relevant to industrialization, and 
reformed labor laws to promote industrial peace.  Their sound fiscal and monetary policies 
fortified investor confidence and guaranteed macroeconomic stability.  By 1975, an extensive 
industrial base had been established as manufacturing’s share in GDP rose from 14% in 1965 to 
22%.   
With the economy at full employment, it was time for Singapore to move up the value chain into 
more capital-intensive and skill-intensive activities.  In the 1960s, factories produced items such 
as matches, fish hooks and mosquito coils.  By the 1970s, these labor-intensive industries 
steadily declined as petrochemicals, electronics, component and precision engineering emerged.  
The compositional change of manufacturing was rapid as Singapore became the leading producer 
of hard disk drives globally by the 1980s. 
From 1960-1985, Singapore had its economic “take-off” phase.  The economic essentials of 
prudent public finances, co-operative industrial relations, sound monetary policies, outward 
orientation and market-based strategies became rooted in Singapore’s ideology, governance and 
culture.  By 1985, the economy had grown 10% per annum as Singapore emerged at the forefront 
of developing countries as a newly-industrialized economy.   
In 1985, Singapore went into an economic recession; the only time in its history where the 
domestic economy contracted while the global economy grew.  The recession revealed structural 
tensions that had been hidden by strong economic growth.  These tensions included resource 
constraints and diminishing returns to investment, thus weakening Singapore’s cost advantage as 
its initial period of growth came to an end.  As a result, structural reforms were enacted such as 
improved wage flexibility in the labor market, faster industrial upgrading, the promotion of 
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innovation, enterprise and entrepreneurship, further entry into regional markets for trade and 
outward investments, and the liberalization of various service sectors such as finance, 
telecommunications and utilities (Menon).   
The modern oasis of Singapore would still be a series of small, poor villages today without its 
natural geographic factors, strong leadership and effective developmental economic policies.  
Singapore is a rags-to-riches story that highlights what a nation can do under developmental state 
economics. 
Based on this economic history of Singapore, LDCs can gain a few lessons (especially Uganda, 
who shares many similarities with the small island nation): 
1. Like Singapore 50-years ago, Uganda is an underdeveloped country with limited industry 
development and a divided population with little shared history or bonds.  
Unemployment is high and Uganda relies heavily on the outside world for food security.  
Despite all of these factors, Uganda has a strategic trade location as a transit point from 
the coast to the hinterlands of East Africa, sharing a border with five countries.  Because 
of this similarity in background to Singapore, Uganda should have a clear objective: 
Creating a better quality of life for the people through strong economic policies. 
2. Uganda needs strong leadership to guide the nation towards economic prosperity.  It 
requires an honest, pragmatic and hands-on government. 
3. Pragmatic Capitalism: Uganda should welcome state-selected foreign trade and 
investment.  Multinational corporations could find Uganda to be a good entry point into 
African market expansion.  Uganda could benefit from this dynamic if the right capital 
control policies are implemented to limit capital repatriation.  These control policies may 
not be direct but in the form of labor quotas in which most labor must be Ugandan. 
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4. Government restructuring:  The government needs to be kept lean, honest and efficient.  
This requires tough laws on corruption, a downsize in civil service, reduced bureaucracy, 
and the halt of the creation of more districts. 
5. Export-led Industrialization: Import-substitution industrialization where foreign imports 
and replaced with domestic production ultimately leads to higher prices, decreased trade 
and economic growth and thus isn’t a model to be considered by Uganda.  Export-led 
industrialization, on the other hand, is a trade and economic policy that aims to accelerate 
a country’s industrialization process by exporting goods that the nation has a comparative 
advantage for and protecting nascent industries with a future comparative advantage. 
Uganda should undertake export-led industrialization, focusing on the 
products/commodities that it has a comparative advantage for (in the region) and 
cultivating/protecting nascent industries with future comparative advantage potential.  
This requires improving ease of doing business in the country. 
6. The state needs to invest in infrastructure development, industrial land and basic 
education (that emphasizes technical skills) to promote industrialization as a driver for 
economic growth. 
7. Fiscal and monetary policies must be sound to fortify investor confidence and guarantee 
macroeconomic stability 
8. Uganda should focus on developing its financial services to promote innovation and 
increase financing/support of industry. 
The lessons and implications from Singapore’s example are clear and the potential benefits are 
huge.  However, while developmental state policies are evidently beneficial on the national 
economic level and human development level, it is important to view the potential effects on 
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specific economic stakeholders.  Specifically, this paper will look at the effects it has on 
manufacturers, exporters, and those in the private sector. 
Representing manufacturers, an economic policy analyst of Uganda Manufacturers’ Association 
was interviewed.  He stated that free-market trade policies should only be between countries of 
equal economic scale to avoid a huge export deficit due to disproportionately exporting basic 
goods while importing final products.  Also, industry protectionism is viewed as important to 
their interests as manufacturers cannot compete on the global market yet and need time to catch 
up to global standards.  UMA believes that to support its commercial/industrial development and 
entrance into a middle-income economy, the cost of doing business and cost of production must 
improve, which requires a hands-on government.  Ultimately, UMA advocates for specific 
nascent industries being protected.  Furthermore, to ensure economic development is inclusive 
and therefore human development is achieved, UMA believes that people is rural areas need to 
be empowered as most of the population lives in those areas.  This would be done through 
government increasing salaries in those areas to spark industries to move there while also 
building credit facilities and investing in technology (Uganda Manufacturers’ Association). 
Uganda’s exporters are represented by the Uganda Export Promotion Board.  An interview 
conducted with an analyst revealed that exporters were hurt by Uganda’s liberalization policies 
due to foreign competition.  Instead, UEPB supports some level of government control in which 
they regulate prices, help with import distribution to ensure equitability and targeted incentives 
for value-addition industries as Uganda needs to transition away from raw materials towards 
final goods to reduce their export deficit (Uganda Export Promotion Board).   
The only agreement of neoliberal trade policies came from the private sector who was 
represented by a policy and trade officer from Private Sector Foundation Uganda.  The officer 
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stated that liberalization was inevitable and therefore they advocated for liberalization with 
policies put in place to help people better position themselves for increased competition.  This 
entails focusing on reducing costs of production through infrastructure development and access 
to credit as well as opening up the market gradually.  Although the officer admits that smaller 
private firms have been hurt by liberalization, they attribute this to inferior export promotion 
policies that don’t incentivize firms with free-market policies.  Ultimately, PSFU believes that 
wealth can only be created in a competitive business environment.  Furthermore, they believe the 
inequality from neoliberal policies can be offset through growing the agricultural sector as that is 
where most of the population lies.  However, the population will double in 25 years and land will 
not so this is not a sustainable model.  Instead, the agricultural sector will either become too 
diluted or too concentrated in the hands of a few elites (Private Sector Foundation Uganda). 
According to an officer in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, whose department 
handles all trade policy decisions, the current neoliberal position has been harmful to Uganda as 
the trade deficit increases and it is unclear if the average level of income has increased or 
decreased.  It has led to inefficiency and environmental destruction.  Instead, government needs 
to monitor industries and place resources accordingly.  Even within the ministry that handles 
trade policy creation and implementation there are conflicting views as many feel that Uganda’s 
current neoliberal policies haven’t worked as intended (Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Cooperatives). 
Overall, it is clear both from historical examples and from the viewpoints of key stakeholders, 
including government officials, that developmental state policies have a lot of potential to grow 
the economy in a controlled and inclusive manner while the neoliberal trade policies have failed 
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to encourage human development and inclusive economic development.  Therefore, on the 
global trade level, Uganda should employ developmental state policies. 
6.2 The Case for Free Market Policies in Regional Trade 
While developmental state-based policies in global trade is beneficial for LDCs, regionally the 
trade position employed should be one based on free-market values.  To understand why, the 
current example of the Tripartite Free Trade Area will be examined: 
The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) is a proposed African free trade agreement between the 
regional economic communities (RECs) of COMESA, SADC, and EAC, declared on 12 June 
2011.  The proposed area will stretch from Cape Town to Cairo, creating an integrated market 
with a total GDP of about US$1trillion and a population of more than 600 million people.  The 
agreement will come into force once ratified by the parliaments of two-thirds of the 26 member 
states and will be achieved through the harmonization of policies and programs across the three 
RECs (SADC, 2015). 
The objective of the proposed agreement is to accelerate African economic integration and 
achieve sustainable economic development that will alleviate poverty and improve the quality of 
life for people in the region.  Between 2004 and 2014, trade within COMESA grew from 
US$8bn to US$22bn, within SADC it rose from US$20bn to US$72bn and within SADC it grew 
from US$2.6bn to US$8.6bn.  Overall, trade between the three areas rose from $30.6bn to 
US$102.6bn.  The proposed agreement, on paper, would seek to take advantage of this growth 
(where the continent has seen an average growth rate of 5% during the last few years) and 
accelerate it (Juma). 
The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement has three core pillars: market integration, infrastructure 
development and industrial development.  Under market integration, economic growth will be 
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achieved through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade.  Under infrastructure 
development, enhanced connectivity and lower costs of doing business will be attained.  The 
issue of productive capacity constraints will be addressed under the pillar of industrial 
development (SADC, 2016). 
Trade within Africa is still relatively low, hovering around 10-12% in comparison to intra-
European trade, which is 70%.  Under the TFTA, trade within Africa would increase to 30% 
(BBC, 2015).  The TFTA will create a much larger market whose free trade status will maintain 
steady economic growth of 6-7% annually, projecting Africa to reach a GDP of US$29trillion by 
2050.  This growth will contribute to poverty reduction and increased prosperity.  The prospect 
of a larger market will also stimulate industrial development, creating new industries and jobs as 
well as diversifying Africa’s economy away from raw materials.  Not only will the TFTA spur 
industrial development but will also incentivize cross-border infrastructure development to 
support its industrial development (Juma). 
The TFTA will allow members to achieve economies of scale, eventually allowing them to 
compete globally.  This also results in an overall positive welfare effect on the region of at least 
US$3.3bn per year if all tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated.  The effect is very unequally 
distributed with 72% of the welfare gains going to South Africa alone; however, only Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have negative welfare gains as a result (Mold).   
Lastly, the TFTA lays the groundwork for the African Union’s Continental Free Trade Area 
plan, in which the whole continent will be a free trade zone.  By merging the three RECs into the 
African Economic Community, inconsistencies and costs of overlapping REC memberships are 
resolved (Ngwenya).   Furthermore, consumers in Africa will gain access to cheaper and better 
quality products as a result of African economic integration. 
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However, there are a few challenges ahead: 
Political Will 
There are many challenges to realizing the TFTA.  The most pertinent challenge is that many 
countries don’t want to commit to the agreement due to the fear of negative impact on their 
economies.  There are no mechanisms for helping the losers of the agreement, and thus 
convincing countries to sign the agreement is difficult.  Many of the countries have small 
economies and produce few exportable goods.  The TFTA would mean they’d have to compete 
with larger economies that could hurt their industries.  Specifically, many are concerned that, 
under the TFTA, industrial production would concentrate in Egypt and South Africa, who have 
the highest productivity levels.  However, simulation results suggest this will not be the case as 
total volume of industrial output will only increase modestly with more growth in industrial 
output in smaller economies (Mold).  Africa has had similar development plans in the past such 
as OAU, NEPAD and Lagos Plan of Action only to become white elephant projects (Mubangizi).  
To realize the TFTA requires political will, commitment and stability. 
 
Non-tariff Barriers 
The TFTA agreement provides a mechanism for harmonizing COMESA, EAC and SADC NTB 
arrangements through a process of identifying, categorizing, reporting, monitoring and resolving 
NTBs.  Eliminating NTBs is vital as complete tariff liberalization for intra-TFTA trade with the 
elimination of NTBs projects an aggregate net benefit for the region of US$3.3bn per year.  This 





Customs duties are a major source of government revenue in the region.  The governments of 
countries such as Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique, DRC, Uganda, Zambia, Swaziland, Tanzania 
and Namibia collect up to half of their revenue from customs duties.  Thus, the TFTA may signal 
huge loss of revenue for governments involved.  However, it is important to note that most tariff 
revenue comes from imports from the EU and East Asia, which would be unaffected by the 
TFTA.  Furthermore, the cost of the removal of tariffs would be relatively modest due to revenue 
gained from increased trade and industrialization (Mold). 
 
Movement of People 
The fear of increased unemployment and amplified socio-cultural conflict, has led to the free 
movement of people being questioned (Kapkirwok).  While, perhaps the complete free 
movement of people within the TFTA is not realistic currently, the free movement of goods and 
services cannot exist without the free movement of people.  Thus, it is important that the free 
movement of business persons be negotiated to facilitate trade in the area. 
 
Product Diversification 
Most African countries export raw materials and basic commodities outside the continent while 
importing manufactured goods and finished products from outside.  The result is that the 
continent has a huge trade deficit, mostly stemming from trade with the EU and US.  Thus, it is 
important to emphasize the diversification of goods and services and adding value through 
industrial development and investment in infrastructure.  Through regional integration, countries 
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As is usually the case, implementation could prove to be the biggest challenge to the TFTA.  
Already behind schedule, governments could continue to drag their feet on implementing the 
agreement or fail to remove trade barriers.  Ultimately, solving this problem requires political 
will and good governance.  However, it also involves exploring new areas such as infrastructure, 
intellectual capital and agriculture. 
Poor infrastructure, high transaction costs and low levels of industrialization have left African 
intra-trade low.  Average transport costs in Africa are twice the world average and are thought to 
harm trade more than tariffs.  Thus, for the TFTA to be implemented to its full potential, 
connectivity and linkages among member states must be improved.  This comes from investment 
in transport infrastructure, energy and information and communication technology infrastructure 
(ICT).  Through ICT investment e-learning, e-commerce, and e-governance are enabled and 
connectivity is increased.   
Many countries lack a skilled workforce.  Countries like this, such as Rwanda have benefitted 
from highly trained personnel within the region.  Others, however, protect their few jobs instead 
of opening up to boost their economy.  If visa restrictions were not an obstacle, the region would 
be an intellectual hub due to its numerous universities.  To maximize use of intellectual capital, 
educational policies in the region must be harmonized and free movement be given to students 
and teachers. 
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Agriculture is Africa’s most neglected sector although it employs 70% of the continent.  The 
region has fertile soils and good climate, yet food security remains weak.  To maximize the 
benefits of the TFTA, African governments need to give sufficient funding for agricultural 
innovation to improve food security and increase food surplus for exports.  Output must increase 
to avoid a situation where demand increases and supply stays limited, leading to food insecurity 
as producers flock to more lucrative regional markets. 
The eventual goal of the TFTA is 100% liberalization of tariff lines.  However, upon entry into 
the TFTA, only 60-85% of tariff lines need to be liberalized with the remaining lines being 
liberalized over five to eight years.  This is a big disadvantage for Uganda who has already 
liberalized more than others thus increasing competition in their domestic markets while getting 
unequal market access in return.  Furthermore, Uganda doesn’t stand a chance in the 
manufactured goods market due to high costs related to electricity costs and unsteady supply.  
Instead, Uganda’s competitive advantage lies in exporting low value-addition agricultural based 
raw materials.  Thus, on the surface level it may appear as though the TFTA doesn’t benefit 
Uganda.  However, Uganda has the perfect opportunity to utilize its geographical position as a 
trade center between the SADC countries as a safer transit point to final destinations like South 
Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.  Under the TFTA, Uganda will benefit immensely in terms 
of achieving inclusive economic growth (Mubangizi).  To achieve this, the issues above must be 
addressed.  
 
6.3 Capacity Building 
As the next WTO Ministerial Conference approaches, it should be the priorities of LDCs such as 
Uganda to increase their trade and negotiations capacity.  This paper looks at the WTO 2016 
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Public Forum to analyze what the key priorities of LDCs should be to build their capacities in 
reaction to the agenda set by the economic powers in the WTO: 
The fifteenth annual Public Forum of the World Trade Organization was held in Geneva, 
Switzerland between 27 to 29 September, 2016.  It provided a platform for academics, civil 
society members, the media, non-governmental organizations and leading global businesspeople 
to come together with representatives of governments and inter-governmental organizations to 
discuss some of the major trade and development issues of the day.  The theme of this year’s 
forum was “inclusive trade”.  The forum emphasized three sub-themes: 
• Expanding the capacity of Small-and-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to participate in 
international trade as innovation has been driving SMEs’ expansion into the global 
market 
• The importance of new digital technologies on trade was highlighted.  Trade is a driver of 
innovation and new technologies has transformed the way the world trades.  Thus, the 
forum focused on how trade can foster innovation and how trade needs to adapt to keep-
up with rapidly changing technology.  This brought up questions such as: 
o  “Whether the WTO needs to reform trade rules to allow members to fully benefit 
from innovation?”  
o “If technological innovation is a driver of development?”   
o “How can innovation enhance the trading capacities of developing countries?”   
• How best to include marginalized groups, such as women, in international trade 
This forum, in the view of the developing countries, completely ignored the Doha Development 
Agenda issues, which are yet to be resolved.  This section examines the stance of Least 
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Developed Countries (LDCs) in response to the Public Forum and where they should focus their 
efforts to expand their capacities (World Trade Organization). 
Doha Development Agenda 
During the Bali 9th WTO Ministerial Conference, WTO members agreed to develop a work 
program to resolve the Doha Development Agenda, which has yet to come to an agreement after 
decade long negotiations.  In the 2016 Public Forum, African nations accused the developed 
countries of shifting focus away from remaining issues of the Doha Round.  This resistance 
forced a deferment on e-commerce/digital trade negotiations, guided by the Nairobi MC10 in 
which “ministers agreed to prioritize work on the outstanding Doha issues, such as Agriculture 
Trade Distorting Domestic Support, SSM (Special Safeguard Mechanism), Public Stockholding 
for Food Security, Cotton, LDC (least-developed countries) priorities, TRIPS (Trade-Related 
Intellectual Properties) and last but not least Development and S&DT (special and differential 
treatment)”.   
However, this resistance is being challenged by the US and its partners who want e-commerce to 
be a central theme of the 11th Ministerial Conference.  It’s important to note that there needs to 
be a thematic consensus at the WTO for each conference. 
The LDCs’ response should be to oppose the opening of any new issues before the conclusion of 
the Doha Agenda issues under the agreement made at the Nairobi MC10 and the 1998 work 
program on e-commerce, which states that no negotiations can be held on e-commerce that isn’t 




The US and its partners want to liberalize e-commerce through prohibiting digital customs 
duties, enabling cross-border data flows, promoting a free and open Internet, preventing 
localization barriers, barring forced technology transfers, protecting critical source code.  
Clearly, these steps towards liberalization would be at the expense of LDCs who lack the 
infrastructure to reap any of the benefits while their domestic markets would be open up to 
further competition and their national sovereignty undermined.  The issue of LDCs is not that 
they lack market access but that they can’t compete in the market against the subsidized goods of 
the US/EU due to poor infrastructure and unfair trade deals.   
The US and its partners argue that e-commerce liberalization will benefit developing countries 
through expanding opportunities and furthering inclusivity in the global value chain for their 
SMEs.  However, a World Bank study recently stated that "although there are many individual 
success stories, the effect of technology on (…) expansion of opportunity for the poor and the 
middle class (…) has so far been less than expected".  The Global North also argues that e-
commerce liberalization opens up innovative solutions to developing countries through sharing 
of technology.  However, due to the TRIPS agreement, these technologies would have to be 
imported at high-costs to the benefit of the exporting developed countries with no real benefit to 
the importing LDC, as seen through the World Bank study.  As such, LDCs should not support 
the liberalization of e-commerce as the benefits are marginal in comparison to the costs of 
exploitation. 
 
Trade Facilitation Agreement 
During the Bali Ministerial Conference, WTO members concluded negotiations on a Trade 
Facilitation Agreement that would expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods as 
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well as set out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate 
authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues.  The Agreement will go into 
effect once 2/3rds of members have domestically ratified it.  Currently, of the 19 COMESA 
countries, six have signed, not including Uganda.  While the agreement looks good on paper, 
LDCs should not sign it.  Africa’s share of global trade is around only 2%.  This agreement 
would make it easier for imports to enter Africa without much benefits to exports due to its small 
scale.  The net result would be a further export deficit for LDCs.  Therefore, LDCs such as 
Uganda should not sign the Agreement. 
 
Agriculture and Food Security 
Around 75% of the population in developing countries live in rural areas and the majority rely on 
agriculture for their livelihood.  Under the Doha Development Agenda, relating specifically to 
agriculture, services and manufacturing, the World Bank predicts that global income could 
increase by $3000bn/year with $2500bn going to developing economies.  Therefore, it is 
important that issues discussed from Doha be implemented in the global trading system such as: 
• Promoting export competition through removal of agricultural domestic trade distorting 
support (eg: US/EU agricultural export subsidies) 
• Improving market access by designating and protecting Special Products that have an 
impact on food security, livelihood security and rural development 
• Implementation of public stockholding for food security 
• Implementation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for LDCs (especially to address the 
challenges of import surges) 




Regional integration is a key priority for LDCs such as Uganda.  It offers new opportunities to 
develop SME exports and create new value chains.  Currently, the cost of moving a container to 
an African neighboring country is higher than moving it to New York.  Unless Africa improves 
upon regional integration, its trade competitiveness will continue to suffer. 
Recent East African integration through the East African Community (EAC) has resulted in large 
trade increase as well as improvements in welfare and stability, according to research.  This is 
due to improvements in cross-border flows of finance, goods trade, free movement of persons, 
regional value chains and cross-border infrastructure. 
However, there are issues around Regional Free Trade Agreements.  The COMESA countries 
export many mutual products.  As such, they place tariffs on these “Sensitive Products”, which 
are most goods they export, to protect their domestic markets.  Furthermore, the free movement 
of labor causes tension among populations.  This being said, it is important for LDCs to integrate 
regionally to grow their economies and improve their capacities. 
 
Productive Capacity Building 
For LDCs to build their productive capacities requires investment in “infrastructure, finance, 
energy, skills, laws and regulations”.  This includes incentivizing the fundamental enablers or 
financial institutions to fund SMEs as a lack of financing is a major barrier to the economic 
prosperity of LDCs.   
Rather than utilizing e-commerce liberalization to expand capacity through technological 
development and market access, sustainable investment practices can improve physical 
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infrastructure, advance innovation capacity and develop technology to build the capacity of 
LDCs while working towards the Sustainable Development Goals. 
In conclusion, the priorities of the LDCs, as the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference approaches, 
should be focused around the unresolved issues of the Doha Development Agenda, e-commerce 
liberalization, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, protecting agriculture and food security, 
regional integration, and productive capacity building in order to expand their negotiations and 
trade capacities given the current state of the WTO.  These issues must be at the center of 
negotiations at the next Ministerial Conference rather than thematic approaches like e-commerce, 
which is to the clear benefit of SMEs and corporations of developed countries (World Trade 
Organization). 
 
7.0 Conclusion and Suggestions 
Uganda is approaching 2020 rapidly and if the country wants to achieve its mission of middle-
income status (that is also inclusive to the interests of civil society as a whole), its trade position 
will have to be solid.  Ultimately, based on the findings of this paper there is a clear answer as to 
what trade position would be most beneficial to Uganda’s national development in the context of 
human development as well as economic development. 
In global trade Uganda needs to move away from neoliberal trade policies that have allowed 
developed countries to exploit their markets without receiving the benefits of reciprocation due 
to their weak trade capacity.  The result of Uganda’s neoliberal policies in trade have been a 
huge trade deficit and massive wealth inequality.  Instead, Uganda needs to employ strategies 
similar to Singapore, where the state has a role in shaping macro-economics.  Uganda needs to 
allow Foreign Direct Investment to thrive while implementing policies that prevent capital 
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repatriation.  Furthermore, while they need to open up their markets to competition they also 
need to protect nascent industries where they may have a potential comparative advantage later 
on.  To achieve this requires that the government is kept lean, honest and efficient through 
enforcing tough laws on corruption, downsizing the civil service, and a halt on the creation of 
more districts.  The result will be that Uganda will have rapidly grown its GDP while improving 
education and healthcare (which are necessary infrastructural improvements needed to continue 
economic growth), as Singapore has done. 
In the context of regional trade Uganda should actually promote neoliberal trade policies and 
regional integration.  By having free trade agreements between economies of similar size 
investment, competitiveness, innovation, infrastructure and wealth will increase in the region 
without some countries being exploited by others.  Although there are a few larger economies 
such as Egypt and South Africa that could threaten this fact, the simulations show that this is 
unlikely due to productivity constraints.  To achieve regional integration, the best possibility 
would be the conclusion of the Tripartite Free Trade Area agreement, which would put 26 
African states under one economic umbrella.  However, there are a number of issues to resolve 
before this can be implemented; the biggest issue being political will or lack thereof.  Ultimately, 
political willingness can only come from an understanding that all countries will benefit from 
this agreement and an acceptance that some will benefit more than others. 
Neither trade positions matter, however, if Uganda fails to build its trade and negotiations 
capacity.  This can be achieved, first, by opposing the agenda proposed by the developed 
countries for the next Ministerial Conference, which shifts focus away from the unfinished work 
of the Doha Development Agenda.  Instead, LDCs need to push to resolve outstanding Doha 
issues, such as agriculture trade distorting domestic support, SSM (Special Safeguard 
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Mechanism), public stockholding for food security, cotton, TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual 
Properties) and S&DT (special and differential treatment).  They also need to oppose further 
trade liberalization between the global north and global south until they can be competitive.  
Lastly, LDCs need to increase their productive capacity so that they can be competitive in global 
markets.  The issue LDCs face in global trade isn’t a lack of market access but a lack of ability to 
compete. 
The narrative that “Africa is rising” stands true with countries in the COMESA and East African 
region with average GDP growth rates of 5%.  However, for these countries such as Uganda to 
fulfill its potential will require strong economic policies, building infrastructure, good 
governance, and proper policy implementation and enforcement.   
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Appendix B: Interview questions 
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
1. What does UNCCI membership mostly comprise of?  Manufacturing, services or 
agriculture? 
2. What is UNCCI’s trade position? 
3. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s private sector?  How about on 
agriculture?  How about on manufacturing and exports?  How about on services? 
(looking at case for protectionism) 
4. How does UNCCI balance the interests of agriculture against industry? 
5. How does UNCCI formulate its trade position? 
6. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial 
development and entrance into its middle-income phase? 
7. How does UNCCI advocate or lobby for these policies? 
8. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial 
development and economic development? 
9. What are the challenges of pushing UNCCI’s trade position to the government? 
10. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
11. What policy does UNCCI advocate for in terms of East African regional trade?  How 
does it differ from global trade? 
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a 
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial 
development-wise)? 
13. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow? 
14. How can Uganda increase its trade and negotiation capacity? 
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies? 
17. What is UNCCI’s ultimate goal? 
18. Any other comments? 
 
Ministry of East African Community Affairs 
1. What is Uganda’s current regional trade position and why? 
2. How will East African regional integration benefit Uganda’s development? 
3. What are the effects/results of this trade position on economic development and human 
development (eg: poverty alleviation)? 
4. How does this trade position contribute towards Uganda’s growth to middle-income 
status? 
5. How has this trade position affected the average Ugandan and are they getting the 
financial benefits as well? 
6. How does Uganda formulate its regional trade position? What is the process? 
7. What are some recent examples of trade policy achievements and why? 
8. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
9. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial 
development and entrance into its middle-income phase? 
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10. What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy? 
11. How can Uganda expand its negotiation capacity in the region? 
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a 
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial 
development-wise)? 
13. Can you talk a bit about EAC’s tripartite deal? 
14. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity? 
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan regional trade and its policies?  How can this 
be accomplished? 
17. Any other comments? 
 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives 
1. What is Uganda’s current global trade position and why? 
2. What are the effects/results of this trade position on economic development and human 
development (eg: poverty alleviation)? 
3. How does this trade position contribute towards Uganda’s growth to middle-income 
status? 
4. How has this trade position affected the average Ugandan and are they getting the 
financial benefits as well? 
5. How does Uganda formulate its trade position? What is the process? 
6. What are some recent examples of trade policy achievements and why? 
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
8. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial 
development and entrance into its middle-income phase? 
9. What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy? 
10. How is effectiveness measured? 
11. What are the repercussions/costs of acting against Western interests in terms of Global 
Trade policies?  How have they responded in the past? 
12. How does Uganda go about negotiating with developed economic powers? 
13. How can Uganda expand its negotiation capacity? 
14. What policy does Uganda advocate for in terms of East African regional trade?  How 
does it differ from global trade? 
15. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a 
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial 
development-wise)? 
16. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow? 
17. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity? 
18. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 






Uganda Export Promotion Board 
1. What is UEPB’s trade position? 
2. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s export development? 
3. What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy? 
4. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its export development and 
entrance into its middle-income phase? 
5. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s export development? 
6. What are the challenges of pushing UEPB’s trade position to the government? 
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
8. What policy does UEPB advocate for in terms of East African regional trade?  How does 
it differ from global trade? 
9. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved? 
10. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity? 
11. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 
12. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies? 
13. What is UEPB’s ultimate goal? 
14. Anything else? 
Private Sector Foundation Uganda 
1. What does PSF’s membership mostly comprise of?  Manufacturing or services? 
2. What is PSF’s trade position? 
3. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s private sector? 
4. How does PSF formulate its trade position? 
5. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial 
development and entrance into its middle-income phase? 
6. How does PSF advocate or lobby for these policies? 
7. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s private sector? 
8. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial 
development and economic development? 
9. What are the challenges of pushing PSF’s trade position to the government? 
10. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
11. What policy does PSF advocate for in terms of East African regional trade?  How does it 
differ from global trade? 
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a 
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial 
development-wise)? 
13. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow? 
14. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity? 
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies? 
17. What is PSF’s ultimate goal? 
18. How do you balance interests of agriculture and manufacturing? 
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19. Last comments? 
Uganda Manufacturers’ Association (UMA) 
1. What is UMA’s trade position? 
2. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s manufacturers? 
3. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial 
development and entrance into its middle-income phase? 
4. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s manufacturers? 
5. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial 
development and economic development? 
6. What are the challenges of pushing UMA’s trade position to the government? 
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation? 
8. What policy does UMA advocate for in terms of East African regional trade?  How does 
it differ from global trade? 
9. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a 
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial 
development-wise)? 
10. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity? 
11. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole 
population is raised up and not just the elite)? 
12. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies? 
13. What is UMA’s ultimate goal? 
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